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This box describes the main features of the latest update of the 
Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections. Compared with 
the previous projections,1 presented in December 2016, the latest 
ones include the impact of the changes in the technical 
assumptions observed between 17 November 2016 and 23 March 
2017, with the exception of the assumptions relating to 
performance of the external markets where the cut-off date is 
20 February 2017 (see Table 1).2 The projections also incorporate 
all information known since the close of the previous projection 
exercise up to 24 March, including in particular the latest QNA 
(Quarterly National Accounts) estimates up to 2016 Q4.
The current projections envisage continued economic expansion 
in Spain throughout the three-year period 2017-2019. Growth will 
continue to be assisted by the competitive gains obtained since 
the onset of the crisis and the enduring favourable financial 
conditions, underpinned by the accommodative monetary policy 
stance. Together, these factors will allow the process of continued 
job creation to keep progressing. In addition, although some of 
these temporary growth drivers of the last two years, such as low 
oil prices or the expansionary fiscal policy, have tended to reverse, 
their lagged effects are still lending a certain amount of momentum 
to activity in the short term.
Based on our estimates, GDP could rise by 2.8% this year, before 
slipping to more moderate growth rates of 2.3% and 2.1%, 
respectively, in 2018 and 2019 (see Table  2), precisely as the 
effects of those temporary growth drivers wear off. As regards 
consumer prices, it is estimated that the annual rate of change of 
CPI will increase to 2.2% this year, driven by the uptick in the 
energy component that is largely related to the positive base 
effects linked to oil prices, although it is expected to decline 
moderately as the year progresses in line with oil prices on the 
futures markets.3 When these base effects are exhausted at the 
beginning of 2018, the inflation rate will decelerate, to 1.4% in 
2018, before rising slightly again, up to 1.6% in 2019, as a 
consequence of the decrease in cyclical slack in the economy.
Compared with the December 2016 projection exercise, the 
changes in the assumptions on which the projections are based 
are quite modest. The most notable change is the upturn in oil 
prices as a result of the agreements reached between the oil 
producing countries in late November and early December, shortly 
after the cut-off date for the last projections. Although crude prices 
have dropped again recently, the level projected for 2017 is still 
6.3% higher, on average, than the previous projection. 
The changes in the other assumptions are minimal. Specifically, 
the cost of credit financing for the private sector of the economy is 
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SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 23 March 2017. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of 
the related annual averages.
b A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
c For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
International environment
    World output 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 0.1 0.1 0.1
    World markets 1.7 3.5 3.9 3.9 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
0.00.05.06.37.37.32.2stekram tropxe s'niapS    
7.2-6.0-1.39.151.254.250.44)level( srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.0-20.0-20.0-70.170.170.111.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (b)
    (2000=100 and percentage differences) 113.6 112.0 112.2 112.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
1.01.00.01.01.0-3.0-3.0-Short-term interest rate (3-month Euribor) (c)    
1.00.01.0-6.22.28.14.1Long-term interest rate (10-year bond yield) (c)    
Difference between current 
and December 2016 
forecast
March 2017 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2016-2019): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2016 
joint projection exercise.
2  The projections for the external markets (and for competitors’ prices in 
their national currency) are taken from the March 2017 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
3  The reversal of a temporary increase in electricity prices at the beginning 
of the year also plays a key role in the gradual decline projected over the 
course of the year (see Box 4).
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expected to be very similar to that envisaged in the December 
2016 projection exercise, in keeping with the steady paths traced 
by interbank market rates and government debt yields over the 
past quarter. Nor is the expected growth of Spain’s export markets 
over the projection period significantly different from that considered 
in the previous projections. The changes are somewhat greater in 
the case of competitors’ prices, which are expected to grow at a 
slightly higher pace than that envisaged in the December exercise, 
in line with the moderate depreciation in the euro exchange rate 
observed since then, and in relation to the fiscal policy 
assumptions.
The most significant change in the fiscal ambit is the inclusion of 
the changes in corporate income tax legislation contained in the 
package of extraordinary tax measures approved on 2 December 
2016 by the Council of Ministers (Royal Decree-Law 3/2016) and 
ratified by Parliament on 15 December. Specifically, the government 
has quantified the impact of these measures, which seek to 
broaden the corporate income tax base (limiting tax losses and 
double taxation tax credit, reversing asset value impairment and 
placing limits on the ability to deduct own funds losses), at close 
to 0.5  pp of GDP. In addition, the measures approved include 
higher excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
and an increase in the maximum contribution base to the Social 
Security system.
At the cut-off date for the projection assumptions (which, as 
indicated above, was 23 March), the draft State and Social Security 
Budget for 2017 had not been submitted; the draft budget was finally 
approved by the Council of Ministers on 31 March.4 Accordingly, like 
the December projections, these projections do not include the 
content of the draft budget. In consequence, also as in December, 
various technical assumptions have been used to estimate the tax 
variables. First, it has been assumed that the budget headings 
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Difference between current and 
December 2016 forecasts
2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
1.02.03.01.23.28.22.3PDG
0.01.03.05.16.14.22.3noitpmusnoc etavirP
2.0-0.00.08.08.08.08.0noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
0.02.0-5.0-4.44.43.31.3noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
1.07.0-0.2-1.51.51.30.5sdoog latipac ni tnemtsevnI    
0.00.01.05.44.47.39.1noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI    
2.03.09.18.48.41.64.4stropxe secivres dna sdooG
2.0-3.0-5.14.44.42.53.3stropmi secivres dna sdooG
0.00.01.09.10.23.28.2)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamed lanoitaN
1.02.02.02.03.05.05.0)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamed lanretxe teN
2.0-1.0-4.07.36.38.36.3PDG lanimoN
3.0-3.0-1.05.13.10.13.0rotalfed PDG
1.0-1.0-5.06.14.12.22.0-)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy  0.8 1.1 1.5 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
1.02.03.08.19.16.29.2)sboj tnelaviuqe( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (percentage of the labour force).
End-of-period data 18.6 16.7 15.4 13.9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5
Unemployment rate (percentage of the labour force).
Average data 19.6 17.5 16.0 14.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-) of the nation (% of GDP) 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
General government net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) (b) -4.5 -3.3 -2.8 -2.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
March 2017 projections
Table 2
PROJECTION OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACROECONOMIC MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and as a % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2016 Q4.
a Projections cut-off date: 24 March 2017.
b Does not include information on the draft State Budget for 2017 as it was submitted after the projections cut-off date.
4  The draft was submitted, therefore, between the cut-off date for the 
information used and the publication date of this Report, meaning that it 
was not possible to include the contents in the projections. In any event, 
the draft budget may naturally undergo changes in its passage through 
parliament.
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subject to greater scope for discretion, notably including, by virtue of 
their volume, public investment and procurement, evolve in keeping 
with the nominal potential growth of the Spanish economy;5 and 
second, that all other general government account items evolve, in 
the absence of measures, in keeping with their habitual determinants. 
Specifically, in the case of public revenue, irrespective of the inclusion 
of the legislative changes approved at end-2016, it has been 
assumed that it will grow in keeping with its tax bases, which chiefly 
depend on the macroeconomic environment. Likewise the 
expenditure items that offer less scope for discretion, such as 
pensions (where developments are essentially determined by the 
revaluation formula established by law, and by population ageing), 
unemployment benefits (which primarily depend on developments in 
unemployment) and the interest burden (affected by changes in 
government debt levels and interest rates).
Overall, it is estimated that the changes observed in the 
assumptions used in these and the December projections, 
considered in isolation, will result in a small upward revision in the 
rate of growth of GDP over the projection horizon. In the case of 
inflation, the new trajectory of oil prices dominates the revisions 
prompted by the changes in the assumptions. Prices have been 
revised up in 2017, in keeping with the higher crude prices on the 
spot markets compared with the levels considered in the December 
projections. However, for 2018 and 2019 the slope of the oil price 
curve on the futures markets has flattened somewhat; this will 
result in smaller percentage increases than envisaged in the 
December assumptions and, therefore, in a more moderate 
consumer price performance.
Nevertheless, although compared with the projections published 
in early December the positive impact on activity of the change in 
assumptions is very limited, GDP growth has been revised up by a 
larger amount (specifically by 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 pp, respectively, in 
2017, 2018 and 2019). The revision in the first half of 2017 is 
explained by the latest conjunctural information which points to a 
more upbeat pace of activity in the opening months of the year 
than projected in December. Notable in this respect are the 
strength of the survey-based soft data and of the monthly Social 
Security registrations in the first two months of 2017.
The revision made beyond the short-term is backed by two 
considerations. First, as indicated earlier, the assumptions relating 
to the performance of the external markets were prepared by ECB 
staff on the information available up to 20 February 2017, so they 
do not include the conjunctural information on the performance of 
the world economy released after that date and which, as indicated 
in Section 2 of this Report, is predominantly positive. Looking 
forward, this suggests that global activity and trade will both be 
stronger than was envisaged in the assumptions used in the 
projection exercise, prompting a more favourable assessment of 
the Spanish economy’s external markets and, therefore, an 
upward revision of Spanish export growth.
Second, competitiveness gains have been a key factor in the story 
of the economic upturn, but although they have played a crucial 
role in export sales, there was no clear proof that they had resulted 
in any import substitution. However, the latest QNA data, together 
with the microeconomic evidence available, are beginning to 
provide increasing signs that incipient import substitution is now 
under way. Accordingly, in this projection exercise, a somewhat 
less dynamic import performance than would derive from its 
traditional relationship with final demand has been considered.
As regards the composition of GDP on the demand side, it is 
estimated that GDP growth will essentially continue to be 
underpinned by the contribution of domestic demand, even 
though the slowdown in domestic demand observed in 2016 is 
expected to continue. Net external demand should continue to 
make a positive contribution to the increase in GDP over the entire 
projection horizon.
Among the components of domestic demand, in 2017 private 
consumption will be shaped by the decline in the rate of growth of 
households’ real income, in a setting of higher inflation caused by 
the higher rates of change in the energy component. In this 
respect, the high-frequency indicators have started to point to the 
first signs of slowdown. However, as in the recent past, low interest 
rates, household wealth revaluation and, especially, the strength 
of job creation will continue to play an important role underpinning 
consumption. Given the duration of these factors and the 
temporary nature (in principle) of the rise in inflation, it is estimated 
that households will soften the impact on their real income in 
2017, offsetting it in part by reducing their saving rate. In the rest 
of the projection horizon, household consumption is expected to 
grow at a slightly lower rate than household income, providing for 
a modest readjustment of saving. In consequence, consumption 
would increase by 2.4% in 2017 (0.8 pp less than in 2016), slowing 
to 1.6% in 2018 and 1.5% in 2019.
The high-frequency data on housing starts and housing market 
transactions point to a continuation of the gradual improvement in 
residential investment, which is expected to persist over the entire 
projection horizon on the back of a positive employment 
performance and the expectation that credit conditions will remain 
favourable and that housing prices will rise. As in recent years, 
however, the pace of the recovery is expected to be unequal 
across the country, stronger in the main cities and in the more 
tourism-oriented regions, although the latest figures available 
would seem to suggest that demand may decline somewhat in 
these regions as a consequence of the Brexit process. In any 
event, there has been no change in the assessment made in 
previous projection exercises that the scale of the strengthening of 
this demand component will be mitigated by the relatively low rate 
of new household formation.
Firms’ expenditure on capital goods fell in the second half of 2016, 
most likely influenced by the negative impact of the new corporate 
income tax rules on firms’ cash flows. The new rules provided, 
among other measures, for the reintroduction of (and increase in) 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
5  On the latest in-house estimates, nominal potential growth will be 
around 2% in 2017 and slightly below 2.5% in 2018.
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minimum advance payments (in September) and a reduction in the 
limit on the offset of tax losses and a limit on tax credits to prevent 
international double taxation (in December). In the short term, 
investment by non-financial corporations is expected to grow 
moderately, driven by the continuation of these effects, although 
their impact will be predominantly temporary as in the main they 
are advance payments rather than a genuine increase in the tax 
burden. In a favourable setting for borrowing and against a 
backdrop of strong final demand, business investment, after 
slowing in 2017, is expected to pick up again thereafter.
In 2016 exports performed extremely well, posting a rate of growth 
that was significantly higher than that of the markets themselves and 
than that of euro area exports overall, assisted by the positive 
development of the tourism services component (see Box 7). Exports 
have been revised up for the projection period, in keeping with their 
recent favourable performance, with higher competitiveness gains 
relative to the rest of the world than in the previous forecasts and, 
especially, considering the favourable assessment of the 
performance of the external markets since the cut-off date for the 
information relating to this assumption (which, as indicated above, 
was 20 February). As regards the tourism component, the medium-
term projection assumes no further increase over the projection 
period of the part of the recent flow of foreign visitors that is a 
consequence of heightened insecurity in certain alternative 
destinations. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the projections relating 
to imports incorporate the assessment that evidence is starting to 
emerge of an incipient process of import substitution, as yet of 
modest proportions, as a result of the competitive adjustment 
undertaken by the economy since the onset of the crisis.
Spain will continue to be a net lender to the rest of the world over the 
projection period. However, in 2017 the Spanish economy’s surplus 
is expected to contract by 0.2 pp of GDP compared with the 2016 
figure, as a consequence of higher oil prices, reaching 1.9% of GDP. 
For the following years it is estimated that the net lending position 
will hold steady around that level, in a setting in which a further 
deterioration in the terms of trade would offset the impact of the 
positive contribution of net exports to GDP growth.
Turning to the labour market, the projections envisage that 
employment generation will continue at a strong pace, giving rise 
to quite moderate increases in apparent labour productivity, in 
accordance with past experience of economic expansion in 
Spain.6 Wage growth is expected to remain moderate, against the 
backdrop of a temporary rise in inflation in 2017, keeping unit 
labour costs contained and thus helping to sustain the process of 
employment creation. The increase in the employment rate will 
prompt a further decline in the unemployment rate, which by the 
end of the projection horizon is expected to be around 14%.
The rise in inflation, measured by the year-on-year rate of change 
in the CPI, observed since spring 2016 has gathered momentum in 
recent months, up to 3% in January and February (see Box 4). This 
is a consequence of the acceleration in the energy component, 
while the rate of growth of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and 
energy has continued to move, as it has since mid-2015, within a 
narrow band around a level just below 1%. On the assumptions 
underpinning these projections (and, in particular, given the 
expected trajectory of oil prices), the rates of change of the energy 
component should have peaked, decelerating as from March. In 
addition, it is assumed that, in line with past experience, the pass-
through of higher crude (and electricity) prices to other prices in the 
economy and to wages will be modest, so the non-energy CPI 
should be scarcely affected. In this setting, it is estimated that the 
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy will gradually rise, 
from 1.1% in 2017 to 1.8% in 2019, as the output gap gradually 
narrows and unit labour costs gradually rise. In turn, the rate of 
change of overall CPI is expected to accelerate to an average of 
2.2% in 2017, as a consequence of the performance of the energy 
component, before decelerating to 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. 
The expected trajectory of energy prices, with slightly negative 
fluctuations in 2018 and 2019 as a result of the path expected to be 
followed by oil prices according to the futures markets, also 
explains the positive gap between core inflation, measured by the 
rate of change of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy, 
and overall inflation towards the end of the projection horizon.7
The risks surrounding these GDP growth projections are mainly on 
the downside. The sources of risk arise particularly in the Spanish 
economy’s external context. Specifically, the recent positive trend 
in the financial markets seems to be discounting the start of a 
phase of higher growth and a disappearance of deflation risks, 
which may not be entirely founded. The current market buoyancy 
partly reflects the expectations that an expansionary fiscal policy 
will be implemented in the United States. However, this may either 
not be fully achieved, or may, through its possible interference with 
that country’s monetary normalisation process, cause a reversal of 
recent capital flows into emerging economies.
In this regard, since last summer yields on securities traded on 
developed countries’ sovereign debt markets have begun to rise, 
although it is still too early to determine what underlies this recent 
upward trend in interest rates or how far it will go. However, possible 
further tightening of the yield curve, particularly if it is sudden, could 
cause shocks on the financial markets, which, as mentioned, could, 
in particular, lead to an outflow of capital from those emerging 
economies with the highest levels of foreign currency debt, 
undermining activity in those countries and, consequently, demand 
for Spanish exports. Moreover, given the Spanish economy’s high 
level of debt and its substantial foreign financing needs, the possible 
start of an upward cycle in interest rates could have a negative impact 
on some agents’ income and the strength of their balance sheets.
The tendency to introduce protectionist barriers has also recently 
gained strength in some developed economies. The materialisation 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
6  Box 5 analyses the potential impact of the recently approved increase in 
the national minimum wage.
7  A difference that is also attributable, in part, to the projected slowdown, 
from the current high rates of growth, in the unprocessed food component.
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of these incipient trends would have an adverse effect on global 
trade, which could be particularly detrimental to economies such 
as Spain’s, whose recovery has relied heavily on export growth 
and which is still in the process of correcting its external imbalance.
Additionally, much uncertainty remains about the possible 
implications of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, in a context 
in which the duration and outcome of the bilateral negotiations are 
as yet unknown. In this regard, the most recent data show little 
sign of any specific negative impact of the depreciation in sterling 
on the Spanish economy, except in the case of house purchases 
by British nationals, which slowed in the second half of 2016. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the uncertainty over the 
final shape of the relationship between the EU and the United 
Kingdom while negotiations are under way, or a potential negative 
effect on volumes of goods and services transactions once 
negotiations have been concluded, could have an adverse effect 
on Britain’s imports from other European countries, which in 
Spain’s case, could be exacerbated by the high level of exposure 
of its tourism and non-tourism service exports.8
Meanwhile the Chinese authorities are facing a difficult balancing 
act as they try to support activity by means of credit expansion, 
while seeking to rein in high levels of financial and non-financial 
private sector debt. A hypothetical disorderly correction of the 
imbalances over the projection horizon could put China’s financial 
stability at risk and cause a sharp downturn in the country’s 
activity, with adverse effects for the global economy as a whole.
Finally, the recent fragile growth in activity in some euro area 
countries has caused a weakening of some financial institutions’ 
profitability. If this situation were to become more pronounced or 
excessively prolonged, it could have adverse impacts on their 
capacity to extend credit and, ultimately, on the stability of some 
parts of the European financial system, with the consequent 
negative impact on borrowing conditions and agents’ confidence.
On the domestic front, last November a new government was 
formed following a lengthy caretaker period. This has reduced the 
risks associated with the potential negative impact of the 
provisional status of the executive branch on legislative activity, 
and on the budgetary process in particular. However, the 
uncertainty has not been entirely dispelled, given the lack of a 
stable parliamentary majority. In this regard, it should be recalled 
that the improvement in the Spanish economy’s medium and long-
term outlook for growth in activity and employment still relies on 
various structural reforms being pursued further. Any delay in 
implementing these reforms, or a possible reversal of those 
introduced since the start of the crisis, could have a negative 
effect on investor confidence in the Spanish economy and harm 
growth prospects.
In the fiscal policy sphere, the outstanding adjustment needed to 
restore the public finances to health is still significant. This is 
despite the current context of rapid growth in activity and low 
interest rates, highlighting the need to return to the path of 
budgetary consolidation, taking advantage of the current relatively 
favourable conditions to reduce the structural government deficit 
and public-debt-to-GDP ratio. A budgetary plan of this kind can 
entail costs in terms of short-term economic growth. However, it is 
necessary to moderate future financial costs associated with the 
public debt, reduce the economy’s vulnerability to a potential 
tightening of financial conditions and restore a degree of flexibility 
to fiscal policy so it can respond to possible shocks. 
Lastly, the historical evidence seems to suggest that the extent to 
which price changes in the energy component are passed through 
to wages and other prices in the economy would be relatively 
modest, in both Spain and the euro area. Nevertheless, due to the 
higher degree of energy dependence (see Box 4), and the presence 
of indexation clauses in collective bargaining agreements (despite 
their significant reduction in recent years; see Box 5), the Spanish 
economy may be more prone than its euro area partners to 
generate indirect and second-round inflationary effects on 
consumer prices and wages. Against this backdrop, the priority 
remains averting the risk of the recent upturn in inflation having a 
bigger spillover effect on labour costs and final prices in Spain 
than in other euro area countries, as this would cause a partial 
reversal of the competitiveness gains achieved in recent years.
The balance of risks regarding inflation is also moderately negative. 
On the external front, the downside risks derive from the possible 
materialisation of the negative events identified in relation to 
activity. From the domestic standpoint, the accumulated evidence 
from the past two years indicates persistent difficulty in translating 
a reduction in the cyclical slack in the economy into more dynamic 
price behaviour. This suggests that the anticipated upturn in the 
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy over the projection 
period as a consequence of the additional increase in the degree 
of utilisation of the economy’s resources may not fully materialise. 
Lastly, as discussed above, a risk of the opposite sign would be 
the possibility that the recent oil price rise be passed on to prices 
of other goods and services more strongly than suggested by the 
historical evidence. More generally, the partial reversal in early 
March of last autumn’s oil price rise, against the backdrop of 
doubts as to how the various market suppliers will act, adds an 
extra element of uncertainty to these inflation projections.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
8  See Box 5 in the Banco de España’s September 2016 Quarterly report 
on the Spanish economy.
